اصولِ فقہ میں قیاس کی حدود: ائمہ اربعہ کے مناہج کا تقابلی مطالعہ

Abstract

The science of Usul al-Fiqh (principles of  Islamic jurisprudence) forms the intellectual framework for deriving legal rulings from foundational texts. Within this science, Qiyās (analogical reasoning) occupies a critical and contested position, particularly in its scope, limitations, and methodological legitimacy across various schools of Islamic law. This research undertakes a comparative analytical study of the four major Sunni schools — Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī — focusing on how each school defines, applies, and restricts Qiyās within its respective jurisprudential paradigm.

The study explores the philosophical underpinnings and textual evidences used by the jurists to justify or limit analogical reasoning, and highlights the nuanced differences in their approaches. For instance, the Ḥanafīs embraced Qiyās with broader methodological openness, while the Ḥanbalīs often exhibited a more cautious or restrictive stance. The Mālikīs emphasized the role of public welfare (maṣlaḥah) alongside analogy, and the Shāfiʿīs systematized Qiyās within a strict textual framework.

By critically examining classical texts, legal precedents, and the underlying epistemology of each school, this paper argues that the boundaries of Qiyās are not merely technical, but rooted in deeper legal philosophies and priorities. The findings aim to contribute to a refined understanding of inter-madhhab legal theory, and to inform contemporary Islamic legal discourse by illustrating how diversity in method does not imply discord, but reflects the richness of Islamic legal heritag