

## CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDR: A STUDY OF INDO-US NEXUS TO SABOTAGES CPEC

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### Abstract

*This research discusses the Indian perspective on China-Pakistan economic corridor, emphasizing what is the Indian perspective on CPEC and why India is opposed to the gigantic project. Secondly, it explores what Pakistan and China can do and secure this project. And finally, it also explores the benefits of CPEC for India if it decides to join it. The study maintains that India, from its beginnings, has cast a negative eye on the CPEC project, that it actively supports the separatist groups in Pakistan to carry out terrorist attacks against the Chinese and CPEC workers to frustrate Pakistan and China and make it unsuccessful, but China and Pakistan must be extremely vigilant to thwart Indian attempts. Secondly, it is also hypothesized that India will benefit if it agrees to join it. The United States has openly criticised the project, ultimately supporting the Indian position that Pakistan and China. The article operationalizes the descriptive and analytical investigation while using both primary and secondary data for empirical analysis. Primary data is obtained from the websites of CPEC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and China. While secondary literature is attained from China, Pakistan, India and western sources obtainable acquiescently in the form of commentaries, articles, books, discussion papers, reports and reviews.*

**Key words:** Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Terrorism, Durand Line, Pashtunistan, Taliban

### Introduction

Historically, Pakistan-China relations have been dominated by security and defense, but since 2001 the economic link has taken an unprecedented upward trajectory. (Afzal, 2020) In 2001 Pakistan and China signed the Gwadar port agreement (Gurmeet Kanwal, 2018), in 2006 both the nation signed the free trade agreement (FTA) (Government of Pakistan, n.d.) and in 2014 they signed the CPEC worth \$60 billion. (Garlick, 2018) (Hameed, 2018) CPEC is indicated as a game changer for Pakistan's economy and for regional cooperation in general. (Khan, 2015) Under CPEC large Chinese investment will be made in the construction of roads, dams, and projects to boost Islamabad's energy needs. As a crucial part of the major China-led development initiative, known as the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI), to connect Asia with Europe, the Middle East and Africa, CPEC is widely linked to regional and global hopes, interests, and geopolitics. In the long run, the Chinese finances promised under these schemes will have a major impact on Pakistan's economic development. But India has vehemently opposed from the start. India allegedly maintains that it passes from Indian territory.

Indeed, Indian objection over Kashmir adds to the already long list of Pakistan-India conflicts and mutual issues. India and Pakistan dispute over, establish no cricketing ties, compete at international forums to embarrass, and isolate each other, have fought bloody wars and often become involved in a ceasefire violation on the control line (LoC). In short, there is a long list of controversies that can potentially disrupt normal relations between the two nations, Indian objections are petty and unfortunate. The CPEC, if implemented transparently and diligently, is intended to benefit the economies of many regional countries including India. Kashmir is indeed a disputed territory accepted by UNSC resolution. (Security Council Report, n.d.) Pakistan

accepts it, but India rejects it. India considers its own territory which is problematic and is not supported by legal, moral and political basis. Therefore, Indian objection on the CPEC open a new but dangerous front for them to fight, challenge and compete.

In the following sections we firstly explore the CPEC, its benefits both to Pakistan and China and the entire region around. After that we will elucidate Indian opposition to the project and Sino-Pakistan strategies to prevent Indian opposition. A conclusion that summarises the major findings follows.

### **China-Pakistan Economic Corridor**

CPEC, a 3000 km long corridor passes through Pakistan along three different main routes (eastern, western, and central), linking China's Xinjiang Province city Kashgar with Pakistan's Gwadar port situated on the Arabian Sea. The proposed development strip, (whose eastern route will be operative by the end of 2018, with the complete project scheduled to be completed in 15-year period) includes a comprehensive network of roads, railways, pipelines, fibre optics, and the construction of manufacturing industry along the passage. It involves a bumper \$60 billion investment in Pakistan, roughly equal to 20 per cent of its annual GDP. Mateen Haider, drawing a corollary with the US foreign secretary George Marshall's plan to rejuvenate and resuscitate the dissipated markets of Europe during the Cold War, articulates that CPEC is China's Marshall Plan for Pakistan. (Haider, 2015)

President Xi Jinping is concerned with domestic affairs to a certain degree, but mainly appears to be driven by foreign policy. CPEC is an integral part of President Xi's plan of 'One Belt One Road', also known as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the strategic discourse. Tim Summers argues that OBOR is a major focus of the Chinese grand strategy for a global economy. (Summers, 2015) Using its huge financial resources, China under Xi is asserting its emerging role in the world economy through economic diplomacy. Physically, Beijing will be connected with more than 60 countries (EIU, 2015), and will see an increase of \$2.5 trillion in its economy. (Abbasi, 2016). The \$60 billion-dollar investment intends to create infrastructure network which will see a land route linking China's west to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan controlled Kashmir. Essentially, BRI aims to strengthen China's global role.

The planned economic corridor will reduce China's distance from the Middle East. Currently Chinese ships travel 45,000 km to take oil from the Middle East, once the CPEC becomes functional it will shorten the Chinese distance to 12000 km, not only will it reduce the distance, but it will also save energy, money for the Chinese (China Pakistan Economic Corridor, 2019). It will also link under-developed Chinese areas in its western region to the Gwadar port through a network of roads and railways and possible pipelines.

Also known as the New Silk Road Economic Development Corridor, it aims to revive the ancient silk route to link China with three of the major players of the world economy: Asia, Africa and Europe. (See Figure. 01) With the successful implementation of BRI, China aims to bring home technology, foreign direct investment, and international assistance, and in tandem create new horizons for the Chinese enterprises "to go abroad in search of new markets or investment opportunities". (EIU, 2015) Even if CPEC is the first manifestation of BRI strategy, it is not the only corridor. It consists of three more passageways: a north corridor originating from Beijing passing through Moscow all the way to Germany, the central corridor originating from Shanghai and ending in Iran, and finally the southern corridor which originates in the Xinjiang city of

Kashgar and ends at Gwadar (See Figure 01) which has maritime routes stretching thousands of nautical miles and linking major states of the world.



Figure 1: BRI Plan (McBride, 2015)

### What are the benefits for Pakistan?

CPEC is an exemplary case of the fusion of geo-economic and geo-strategic interests of the two nations with financial and diplomatic relations encouraged by historical bonds. CPEC brings enormous benefits for both Pakistan and China. It is a win-win situation. It is a great demonstration of Pakistan's "Look East" policy, which is extremely significant for the development of underdeveloped areas of Baluchistan and Gilgit Baltistan. Furthermore, it brings enormous benefits to national exchequer as Pakistan will be able to collect transit taxes not only from Afghanistan but also from the states of Central Asia if they decide to join it.

It provides relief to the already busy port of Karachi and Bin Qasim, finally providing a stimulus to maritime trade. It will only generate economic activity, protecting businesses and commerce. Furthermore, it creates a comprehensive network of roads, railways, industrial parks, and includes the promotion of local industries. Pakistan will develop energy storage facilities and if geopolitics remain regular, Gwadar could become a regional hub just like Dubai and other Gulf ports mainly because it is not just a route; fully complies with the concept of economic corridor.

According to Trishia Octaviano, economic corridors

...refer to transport networks that support and facilitate not only the movement of goods and services, but also of people as well as the exchange of information. Economic corridors are not limited to hard infrastructure such as highway systems, rail lines or ports, but also include soft infrastructure such as trade facilitation and trade capacity-building. (Trishia P. Octaviano, 2014)

These benefits are not mere slogans, it has been received unambitiously in Pakistan. It has been received positively across the entire spectrum of Pakistani leaders, experts, and scholars. Former Planning Commission Chairman Ahsan Iqbal considers (the World Bank share his views too)



CPEC “a game changer” for Pakistan (“CPEC Being Considered a ‘ Game Changer ’, Says Iqbal,” 2016), for Premier Imran Khan it is “manifestation of Pakistan-China friendship”. (Tribune, 2019) South Asia expert Anatol Lieven maintains that if the CPEC project is successful, it “could restore Pakistan’s economic growth of the early 1960s, which led economists at the time to predict that the country would be one of the future leading economic powers of Asia”. (Lieven, 2015) CPEC transforms China from a regional power to a global power as Islamabad connects Chinese geography to major regions of the world through its land routes.

CPEC will not only allow road and rail freight to shuttle between Gwadar and Kashgar, but it will also effectively improve Pakistan’s political, economic, and social standings. Politically, it joins up the regions of Pakistan and links 185 million people through a wide network of roads, railways, and pipeline. If implemented watchfully and wholly, it will improve relations among four provinces, and between the provinces and the federal government. Yet again Ahsan Iqbal describes “The CPEC, a trans-regional project, would benefit three billion people of the region through enhanced regional connectivity with Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces and play instrumental role integrating the whole region.” (Ali, 2016)

Economically, it creates millions of jobs, revitalises a sluggish economy and brings huge investment when other countries have been shy of investing in Pakistan. The BBC reports that “the money China is planning to pour into Pakistan is more than twice the amount of all foreign direct investment (FDI) Pakistan has received since 2008, and considerably more than the entire assistance from the United States, Pakistan’s largest donor until now, since 2002”. (Khan, 2015) Iqbal claims that “with China’s help, Pakistan can be one of the world’s strongest economies in 10 years”. (APP, 2015) Furthermore, there are economic zones and two dozen industrial parks planned in major cities like Lahore, Islamabad, and Gwadar. A fibre optic line is also planned under the project reaching from the port city Karachi to Lahore to advance internet connectivity. China has already taken the charge of Gwadar port; besides operating Gwadar for trade, Beijing wants to develop the fishery, cement, and oil industries. (The News, 2015)

Proper implementation of the CPEC will facilitate the containment of extremism in underdeveloped areas. It also strengthens the federal structure in Pakistan if the centre and provinces overcome difference over the CPEC term. Overall, it strengthens the economic ties between Beijing and Islamabad, the weaker link in the partnership. Former Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif describes “CPEC as a corridor of peace and prosperity”, and it is “the grand manifestation of the deep-rooted ties between China and Pakistan”. (Kamran Yousuf, 2016) (Yousaf, 2020)

#### **What are the Benefits for China?**

Former Vice President of the World Bank, Shahid Javid Burki proclaims that Beijing has been planning for many years a land route to access the gulf region, (Institute of South Asian Studies, 2016) which China aims to benefit from both strategically and economically. As already described, Chinese companies are looking for overseas business and new opportunities due to the congestion and economic slowdown at domestically. Similarly, Chinese banks, which have plenty of money, need overseas projects for investment. It will entrench China centrally in the world market and will increase its global influence. It will give China leverage in Pakistan.

Strategically, the corridor offers China much-touted access to the Indian Ocean and helps to avoid the dilemma of the Strait of Malacca. The Strait of Malacca dilemma is a major challenge for Chinese national security. China, like the other major industrialized nations of the world, imports its 80% of oil from the OPEC countries. (B.A. Hamzah, 2017) Chinese imported oil crosses the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea to reach the ports of Shanghai, Hong Kong and Tianjin.

The Malacca Straits cross the areas of Indonesia and Malaysia. Southern China is a conflict in which almost all states claim a smaller island. The United States is the main actor in the race and has signed a multi-layered alliance with East Asian nations to thwart China. So not only does China cover a huge distance, but it also addresses the South China Sea problem. Furthermore, in the event of a conflict with the United States, the supply of oil to China will continue uninterrupted thanks to the CPEC. It will shorten the distance and avoid the threat from the South China Sea. It will also reduce China's spending. China will develop its western part. So, to avoid these challenges, CPEC offers a great advantage to China. In terms of shortened distance, a 3000 km long route from Gwadar to Xinjiang province will shorten China's distance from major energy products from OPEC nations by around 12,000 km. Asad Abbasi stresses that the 3000 km passageway through Pakistan will eventually reduce transportation time for Chinese trade from 12 days to 36 hours. (Abbasi, 2016a) The oil and other trading products will firstly arrive in Gwadar port, and then be transported to China through a wide network of roads and railways.




Figure 2: The Hu Huanyong Line

In addition, it is likely to help China integrate Uyghur Muslim as part of the Chinese development strategy of its underdeveloped areas. 94% of the Chinese population lives in the eastern areas or in the Hu Huanyong line (see fig. 2) and 4% in the western areas including Xinjiang. China plans to spend billions of dollars to bring western underdeveloped areas on par with eastern areas. So, the CPEC will contribute significantly to the Chinese plan. Generally, OBOR helps China to march westward, and dismiss pressure from the US pivot of Asia policy where it is bolstering alliance with South-East Asian nations mainly to control China's rise and influence. The westward trek will offer China its own strategic space to enrich trade and economic links with neighbouring regions.

### **Internal and External Challenges of the CPEC**

The CPEC has some internal and external challenges. It also has security and execution issues mainly in Pakistan. Externally, India opposes, while internally the Baloch separatists compete against the project. (MUHAMMAD AKBAR NOTEZAI, 2019) The Indian challenge is serious and discouraging. India appears unhappy with both China and Pakistan. As for an internal threat, the Baloch nationalists represent a serious internal threat. Even Baloch's nationalist threat has an external dimension. The Indians support the Baloch separatist primarily to sabotage the CPEC.

In addition, bureaucratic bottlenecks and route disputes are delaying the implementation of the project. China considers it a prominent project and wants its early completion, free of delays and controversy. Pakistan will have to be very cautious in its implementation. However, a strategy to strengthen the alliance based on educating people about the usefulness of the corridors can help Pakistani officials to penetrate deeply and widely into society.

The above discussion reveals the number of Chinese finances flowing into Pakistan in coming decades. Indeed, it is likely that the free flow of Chinese finances will be crucial for Pakistan's future infrastructure development and economic enhancement. Any slowdown in Chinese pledges will cast doubt on the fate of these projects and leave a profound effect on Pakistani determination to modernise its socio-economic conditions. Experts have indeed warned about it. Asad Abbasi of London School of Economics cautions Pakistan can experience similar issue African countries have faced. (Abbasi, 2016b) Similarly, Washington based agency symbolises: "a prolonged slowdown in China could diminish financial inflows under the CPEC". (Shahbaz Rana, 2016)

CPEC has essentially made Pakistan dependent on China. Pakistan is not getting investment from other countries. Security, Indo-Pakistan rivalry and reduced US interest in Pakistan have been tough challenges for Pakistani policy makers to overcome. As the pronounced African experience shows, Chinese economic slowdown and interruption in supply of finance could leave huge scars on their economy. Chinese slowdown in its economy has direct bearing funds receiving nations. In countries like Zambia, slowness in Chinese funds have led to joblessness and uncertainty. Moreover, Chinese investment has enhanced the gap between rich and poor; Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, and Mozambique have experienced the negative impact of Chinese investment. Furthermore, in Sri Lanka many projects have come to a halt due to change in government which has showed leaning towards India. (Irfan Husain, 2015) Clearly Pakistan is very dependent on China's largesse's and investment, and a little variation in Chinese promised money will impact on the elite's propaganda. The elite constantly transmits that China is pouring huge sums into Pakistan for ports, roads and now CPEC to cultivate the alliance, and any breakdown in Chinese pledges will make it hard for Pakistani officials to sell the alliance using this point.

### **What is the Indian perspective on CPEC and why India is opposing?**

India is opposing CPEC from day one. (Priyanka Singh, 2017) Though by joining it India stands to gain, but Indian leadership policy statement suggests they are not accepting it and may not accept in near future. (Adnan Aamir, 2020) Despite the Chinese invitation to India to take part in the project and benefit from it, confusion continues to spoil the Indian position. Opinion in India is divided, there are some observers who want to join the CPEC (Sudha Ramachandran, 2015), and then there are some observers who want to be cautious and completely reject participation.

(Abhijit Bhattacharyya, 2017) The official Indian position is based on the position that the CPEC crosses alleged Indian territories and violates its sovereignty. This was stated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi “only by respecting the sovereignty of countries involved, can regional connectivity corridors fulfil their promise and avoid differences and discord.” (PTI, 2018)

However, the Indian opposition is marked by Indian animosity towards Pakistan and China, but it opposes due to following two main reasons. Firstly, the CPEC increases China's position as a regional power by making it a superpower, secondly, the CPEC makes Pakistan a stable economic actor and regional power free from Indian hegemony. (Ishfaq, 2019) For India a prosperous and stable Pakistan is not acceptable. (Rajeev Sharma, 2015)

In addition, New Delhi sees the China-Pakistan alliance against India's main dream of seeking hegemony in Asia. It is known that India has a desire to be accepted as a major power not only in South Asia, but in the international system. (Rizvi, 2002) Clash of India and extra-regional power influence and inclusion in South Asia. India believes that China-Pakistan will protect Azad Kashmir while crossing it, as a result, will strengthen Pakistan's Chinese military presence, ultimately raising concerns about Indian security. (Bhattacharjee, 2017)

In reality, India is causing problems in Jammu and Kashmir. In August 2019, India unilaterally changed the state of Kashmir. New Delhi annexes Jammu and Kashmir and is part of the union territory in total contempt for the international community and the resolution of the United Nations Security Council. India considers the CPEC an obstacle to becoming a great power in Asia. Therefore, Delhi considers it necessary to make the CPEC a failure. Former Pakistani ambassador to China and the current AJK president, Masood Khan maintains:

“Having occupied the territory of one part of Jammu and Kashmir, now it stakes claim of ‘sovereignty’ to Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir, under what law? ...Is India worried because it has moved its 700,000 troops to the Indian Occupied Kashmir to maintain its illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir? Or is it concerned that the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, Azad Kashmir and Pakistan will become prosperous? Or does its anxiety stem from the fear that Kashmir will be internationalised? I would ask: more internationalised than it already is?”. (Pakistan Today, 2017)





Figure 3: China String of Pearl Strategy and Naval Strategy

India sees it against its strategic interests. India imports most of its oil from the OPEC countries. Indian ships carrying oil directly pass-through strait of Hormoz to ship oil to the western ports of Nhava Sheva Mumbai, Kandla, and Mundra in Gujrat. Hence, this sea route that transports oil from the Middle East to the aforementioned ports is extremely significant for India. The Indians apparently believe that Pakistan and China will block Indian ships carrying oil in the event of a conflict. In addition, India is building the port of Chabahar in Iran just 72 km from the port of Gwadar. India believes that both Pakistan and China can limit their access and functioning to Chabahar. The port of Chabahar has often been anticipated as India's counterbalance to the port of Gwadar, where CPEC terminates.

Furthermore, Delhi is investing \$ 20 billion in Iran, while India is building the Salma dam and investing \$ 300 million in the Herat province of Afghanistan. India is increasing relations with Afghanistan and Iran to counter Gwadar port. India is interested in Afghan natural gas resources, but due to conflicting relations with Pakistan it cannot import, therefore it is building a port in Chabahar. By building the port of Chabahar, India will bypass Pakistan. So, India allegedly believes that China can station the navy in Gwadar, which will affect the functioning of Indian port of Chabahar but can also cut Indian supplies from the Middle East. Finally, India also views China's port strategy in a broader context. China is developing a series of ports in the Indian Ocean (China is building many ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan, the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh and also the port of Kyauk Pyu in Myanmar and finally one in Djibouti ); that India considers to be a "string of pearl strategy" to contain India. (Ashraf, 2017)

#### **What Benefits India Get If It Joins CPEC**

Logically, India is ready to win if it decides to join CPEC. It will relate to Western Asia, Central Asia. It will gain access to Afghanistan and Iran. India will have to agree with Pakistan on the



future of Jammu and Kashmir. Mainly, India will accept Pakistan's sovereignty over Kashmir. India acceptance of CPEC will normalize relations between Pakistan and India and could even solve the central problem of Kashmir. A normal relationship will help Pakistan and India reach out to the Central Asian states to pursue their national interests. There are many proposed pipelines. For example, the success of IPI and TAPI largely depends on a rapprochement between Pakistan and India. Once India joins CPEC, it will depend on Pakistan to access Central Asia, West Asia and Iran, and the Middle East. Eventually, the desire for conflict with Pakistan will decrease in India.

Economically, it will benefit the Indian economy. Without a doubt, India is an emerging economy. The world looks to India with pride and future destination for trade and commerce. It has a rising middle class equipped with modern knowledge and experience. India provides cheap labour. Therefore, it is an attraction for many commercial interests. Unfortunately, New Delhi is not acting constructively to reap the benefits of China's regional connectivity strategy. Although a sensible voice was heard, Indians have urged government to seize the opportunity and reap the benefits that come with it. One of the finest Indian former ambassador and foreign secretary, Shyam Saran maintains

“It will be wise to be part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) including CPEC, which provides opportunities. It can pave the way for regional connectivity and improvement in regional trade, which at present is very low compared to other regions of the world”. (Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, 2019)

Essentially, New Delhi's participation will likely exhort many other Asian nations, for example Afghanistan to adopt CPEC. Furthermore, if India joins CPEC, it will open doors of opportunities for connectivity with Central Asian states. It will open the Afghanistan and Central Asia markets for India. India have wished for many years to enter Afghanistan and Central Asia and CPEC is the answer. (Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, 2019) Similarly, it will also open the door of prosperity for Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. The good indicator is that Pakistan and China are ready to induce India by emphasizing that CPEC is a future project and for all nations that wish to join it.

### **Indo-US nexus to sabotage CPEC**

It is not only India, but the US also see CPEC in negative connotations. The US perceives CPEC and BRI against its “hegemony and superpower status”. (Ishfaq, 2019) Ishfaq maintains further “Where India is now placed in the warm (yet unreliable) embrace of America, Pakistan finds itself paired with its ever-loyal iron brother, China”. (Ishfaq, 2019) Since President Obama's inauguration, the United States has leaned toward India and made it a strategic partner primarily to contain China's rise. India has voluntarily taken on this new role. To get rid of Pakistan, in 2018, the US suspended Pakistan's military aid worth \$ 2 billion, while similarly strengthening military and economic ties with India.

The US reaction to CPEC has been both open and covert. Openly, US policymakers have called CPEC unfeasible and a debt trap for Pakistan. Senior American Diplomat for South Asia, Alice wells maintains “the Chinese Communist Party’s development model is non-transparent and prone to promoting corruption. So BRI partnering countries, including Pakistan, would be caught in a vicious debt trap”. (Abid Qaiyum Suleri, 2019)

Furthermore, to dismantle CPEC, the United States continues to create and support discord in Pakistan's Baluchistan province, which is the heart of CPEC. In July 2016, for example, the United States added Jamaat-ul-Ahrar to its list of terrorists. This was troubling for both China and Pakistan, as historically every time the White House has attacked terrorist organizations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, there has been an increase in terror outbreaks in Pakistan. Expert like Ian Price has been weighing to predict the American decision about Jamt-ul-Ahrar, he believes that the decision may not have been premediated, but the outcome does. (Ishfaq, 2019) while Pakistani security elites both from military and civilian side believe that India has established a nexus to sabotage CPEC progress and development. (Mohsin Raza Malik, 2019) Baluchistan is a heart of CPEC. US lawmakers allegedly have been raising human rights violation and independence of Baluchistan at the instigation of India. (Ashok Sharma, 2016) (Times of Islamabad, 2020) The United States also adequately ignored how India managed the workplace of Free Baluchistan, an India-sponsored development, in New Delhi in 2018. To conclude, the America-India nexus is complicit in all of these restrictions against Pakistan and China. The United States endlessly supports India's confusing intrigues in Baluchistan and the different areas of Pakistan.

#### **Option for Pakistan and China to frustrate Indian design**

India's decision to join CPEC will also improve its relations with China. It will create a peaceful environment between the two countries. If there is a competition between them for hegemony and the most powerful state, it will be reduced. China will be in a much better situation. Sometimes China finds it difficult to take sides, be it India or Pakistan, in many conflict situations. For example, on the subject of Masood Azhar, the Kargil war, China finds it difficult to balance its relations with India and Pakistan. Pakistan and China can convince India to join by explaining them that there is nothing strategic about hidden objectives in CPEC, it is just a plan for regional connectivity and economic activity. These efforts by China and Pakistan will lobby India's participation in CPEC.

Similarly, apart from Indian opposition, the major challenge is internal threat. Pakistan army has established *Separate Special Services Force* to protect CPEC related activities. (PTI, 2019) According to former ISPR spokesperson, Major General Asif Ghafoor "Special Security Division (SSD) comprising 9,000 Pakistan Army soldiers and 6,000 para-military forces personnel has been set up for the security of the CPEC project and Chinese nationals working on it". (PTI, 2019) Be that as it may, this doesn't on a very basic level change the current security danger to the efficacy of CPEC and the Chinese in Pakistan. Standing up to the difficulties, the two nations need to cooperate. Something else, not exclusively will the development of CPEC be unreasonable, yet in addition the first accomplishments will be cleared out. Also, in the first place, the biggest trouble has to do with Pakistan's internal environment. Chinese has traditionally followed the rule of non-impedance, so the issue must be understood by Pakistanis. (Liu Zongyi, 2019) Also, Islamabad needs to give a protected situation to financial investors, with the goal that they won't avoid putting resources into Baluchistan by and large and in Gwadar specifically. In any case, before doing that, the state must include the local Baloch's in the general improvement of the Gwadar and CPEC ventures. If not, the circumstance in Baluchistan will keep on falling apart, which doesn't forecast well for the eventual fate of Baluchistan.

## Conclusion

In this article, we have tried to examine the Indian perspective on the CPEC. We have deliberated how Indians can benefit from joining it. Pakistan and China need to understand that India is unlikely to join the CPEC. There are many aspects to it. The growing Indo-American strategic partnership and India's relations with Pakistan and China will do anything to counter it. India and the United States have a policy known to contain China's rise. The only way to do it through opposition to the CPEC. Therefore, Pakistan and China must be more vigilant. CPEC is a success win cooperative project for Pakistan and China. It is an uncommon open door for Pakistan to understand its actual vital and monetary potential. Albeit Indian province of Punjab could be a decent area to be associated with CEPEC passageway. With Kartarpur corridor now useful among India and Pakistan, this financial passage has the capacity to bring India, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan and SCO countries closer. Modi govt should focus on monetary turnover and fortifying its relations with neighbours not making things hard for the destitute individuals of South Asia. The US can urge India to be part of development not anti-development.

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